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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF
COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN NEPAL
Community forestry in Nepal is a fairly successful conservation stt'ategy, largely because o[
restricted resource extraction rather than active forest management., but has so far proven less
successful as a poverty-alleviation strategy. Community forestry exacerbates inequities in access
to, contn)l of, and decision-making about forest resources. 'Nomen often play only token roles,
and few user-group governing committees include members from dalit or occupational castes.
When such members of traditionally disadvalllaged groups do serve on user group committees,
their participation tends to be marginal. In this paper I argue that an institution specifically
mealll to increase people's participation on a large scale actually presents opportunities to limit
certain people's participation. As a remedy, I argue that new legal instrull1elllS and institutional
arrangements must ensure fair distribution of forest benefits and partiCipation in community
forest decision-making. Towards that end, l consider a st rategy of democrat ization for community
forestry, and suggest ways that community forest user groups could be organized so that all
interests are represented on forest user group committees and engaged in decision-making.
Community forestry in Nepal is often touted as
a successful model for participatory, community-
based forest management in developing countries.
The evidence clearly indicates that community
forestry is indeed improving forest protection and
regeneration. Intuitively, improvements in forest
resource availability should lead to improvements in
the flow of those resources to meet the community's
subsistence needs: if community forestry is
improving forest conditions in Nepal, then it
should be improving the livelihoods of those who
are dependent on forest resources. However, while
community forestry has the potential for improving
rural livelihoods, its actual contributions to the
poorest have been limited. In this paper I argue that
community forestry is more successful at conserving
forest than improving livelihood. The livelihood-
enhancing potential of community forestry is
constrained by unequal power relations at the local
level. Local power disparities may even be reinforced
by the ways community forestry is implemented and
government relates to community forest user groups.
As a potential solution for part of the problem, I
explore the possibility of democratizing community
forest decision making, suggesting one scenario in
which executive committees would be comprised
of representatives elected at the tol level within a
community forest user group.
Data for this paper were collected from multiple
sources using a variety of methods during six
months of field research between October 2002 and
April 2003. Micro-level data about user groups and
livelihoods are from a household survey conducted
by the UK-based community forestry project, the
Livelihoods and Forestry Programme (LFP) At the
meso-level, I used semi-structured interviews to
collect data from LFP staff, Nepal government forest
officials and technicians, and local NGOs contracted
by LFP. I interviewed all district-level LFP staff
employed in Nepal at the time of my fieldwork. At
the macro-level, I used semi-structured interviews
with all of LFP's program/managing staff, as well as
three officials each from the Ministry of Forest and
Soil Conservation and the Department of Forests,
all of whom were highly placed and had some
responsibility for community forestry.
COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN NEPAL
Community forests in Nepal are nationally owned forest
areas handed over to local user groups for community-based
protection and utilization. Each group of users develops
its own constitution and forest plan when applying for its
community forest. This process involves identifying users and
creating a formal forest association called a Community Forest
User Group (CFUG), which is responsible for protecting the
forest, (subject to the District Forest Officer's oversight) and
permitted to generate income from forest products and small,
forest-based industries. According to government policy, all
actual users of a given forest should be included in the user
group.
A typical community forest formation process proceeds
as follows (see DoF 1995, 1995, 2001). Traditional users
notify staff of the District Forest Office (DFO) that they want
forestland formally handed over to them. Local DFO staff
are then sent to identify all forest users, an often truncated
and cursory process (Pokharel1997; Springate-Baginski et al.
2001). After the initial request, DFO staff conduct meetings
within a community to collect a variety of opinions about
forest use and to generate consensus among users, which is
in effect a negotiation between the potential user group and
the DFO.
When the forest is 'opened' for use, there are rules and
sanctions in place to control harvesting activities for most
forest products. Generally, each member household of the
user group is allowed to harvest an equal amount of a given
forest product regardless of household size or income. Those
members who do not need the product often sell their surplus
to other users or nearby communities. Most CFUGs collect
dues from their members and some sell minor forest products
collectively. Collective funds are kept in a bank account used
for forest management activities (at least 25%)
or community development activities.
Legally, user groups have access, use,
management, and exclusion rights to
community forestland, though ownership
remains with the government. CFUGs may
select or elect the membership of the Forest
User Group Committee, set prices for and sell
forest products, and enforce rules.
As originally conceived in Nepal's Forest
Sector Master Plan of 1987, community forests
were meant to meet the subsistence needs of a
community. According to the Forest Act 1993,
however, CFUGs are also to benefit financially
from their management activities, i.e. they can
generate income from their community forest.
Because these two policies lead, in some
cases, to conflicting recommendations, there
is ongoing debate about whether community
forests should meet both subsistence and
commercial needs. From the perspective
of Nepal's Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation and its
Department of Forests (DoF), the agencies charged with
conserving and maintaining forests, the primary goal of
community forestry is protecting forest, not improv ing
livelihoods, which are incidental and of secondary concern.
This contrasts with the goals of many bilateral donor project
goals, particularly those of the UK's Livelihoods and Forestry
Programme (LFP), which seeks to improve livelihoods through
community forestry. LFP supports community forestry in
Nepal in part by providing financial and technical support to
the Department of Forests, especially at the district level. In
contrast to Nepal government foresters, I suspect forest users
are primarily concerned with how healthy forests contribute
to their own livelihoods.
LIVEllHOODS STATUS IN RURAL NEPAL
WEALTH DlsP ARITIES
The UK's LFP household surveys collected data about
both yearly cash incomes and assets owned by a household,
including such things as radios, televisions, gas stoves,
bicycles, telephones, pressure cookers, etc. As Table 1
shows, household yearly income varies substantially among
households, and the total value of a household's assets varies
even more substantially than income. These data on income
and assets clearly demonstrate the considerable wealth
disparities in rural Nepal.
LFP created four wealth groupings based on asset own-
ership that they use to define relative levels of poverty and
to analyze baseline indicatorsl Four categories emerge: very
poor households, with a total value of assets equal to or less
than 1000 Nepali Rupees (NRs.); poor households between
NRs. 1001 and 6790; intermediate households between NRs.
6791 and 14,676; and wealthy households' greater than NRs.
14,6772
Annual Income Total Asset Value
Rupees Dollars I Rupees Dollars
54,983 733 7898 105
35,000 467 2145 29
30,000 400 ;000 13
120 1.60 0 0
1,669,600 22,261 3,909,000 52,120
19,000 253 1000 13
35,000 467 2145 29
64,000 853 4290 57
74,858 92,130
251h Percentile
50lh Percentile
751h Percentile
Vulnerable households often borrow money to meet basic
needs, not to invest in productive activities, as may wealthy
households. The need to spend money on basic needs limits
the capacity of a household to invest in productive activities,
schooling children, etc. Poor households rarely have the
collateral or social standing to qualify for loans from banks
and other 'official' sources. As a result, many households in
rural Nepal take loans through local money lenders charging
24% to as much as 36% interest, burdening households with
severe debt.
Among the households surveyed, 47% borrowed money some
time in the year before the survey. The average loan was NRs.
26,700 at an average interest rate of 28%. Poorer households
borrow more frequently than wealthier households (p < .001).
supposed to help meet these basic needs. However, large
majorities of the surveyed households report deficits between
the forest products they need and actually receive from
community forests. There are two possible causes for this.
Many community forests are too small or unproductive to
supply the households in their user groups, regardless of how
well they are managed and community forest user groups
may also place significant limitations on the use of their
forestland, perhaps more than is necessary for sustainable
forest management.
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 illustrate demand for and use of forest
products in more detail. Households were asked to state the
annual amount they needed of each forest product listed and
the amount they collected from various sources. Table 2 lists
HHs needing % HHs needing HHs getting % Total HHs getting % Needful HHs getting
Product product product product from CF product from CF product from CF
Fuelwood 2848 99.20 1687 58.76 59.23
Grass 2674 93.14 1249 43.50 46.71
Fodder 2426 84.50 682 23.75 28.11
Leaf Litter 1890 65.83 884 30.79 46.77
Poles 546 19.02 160 5.57 29.30
Timber 347 12.09 99 3.45 28.53
Herbs 18 0.63 5 0.17 27.78
Within the four asset categories, 52% of very poor, 45.9% of
poor, 38% of intermediate, and 36.4% of wealthy households
borrowed money. The most common use of loans (22.4% of
borrowers) is for consumption, such as buying food to see a
family through lean times.
Only one-third of households that produce food grains
produce enough to feed the family for an entire year. Overall,
67% of households have a food deficit, usually two to six
months a year. Food defiCiency seems to be more common
among disadvantaged groups3 (about 79% of Rai, Limbu, and
Gurung households, and almost 94% of dalit households).
There is a significant
association (p < .001) between
asset category and percent of
total household expenditures
spent on food. A higher
percent of poorer households'
expenditures go for food than
[orwealthier households.
atural Resource
Dependency and Access
Most rural households in
Nepal require forest products
[or their livelihoods, and
community forests are
the number and percentage of households stating at least
some need for forest products, the number and percentage of
all households fulfilling at least some of their stated need from
community forests, and the percentage of needful households
fulfilling at least some of their reported need through
community forests. Note that the only forest product for which
a majority of households are supplied through community
forests is fuelwood. These numbers indicate that community
forests are not meeting or even partially fulfilling the forest
product needs of a majority of member households (except
in the case of fuelwood). Recall that all 2871 households
surveyed belong to community
forest user groups.
Table 3 shows the total
households surveyed reporting
a deficit4 for each forest
product and the percentage of
households being supplied by
community forests that still
have a deficit. This table shows
that even for those households
getting forest products from
community forests most are not
getting all that they need. This
can put poorer households at
a disadvantage if they cannot
TABLE 3: PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS EXPERIENCI G FOREST
PRODUCT DEFICITS
% Total HHs
with a deficit
Fuelwood
Grass
Fodder
Leaf Litter
Poles
Timber
Herbs
97.09
99.66
96.91
83.12
84.62
82.42
72.22
% HHs using CF
sti II having deficit
95.08
99.28
89.00
63.91
47.50
38.38
00.00
81.80
81.62
74.71
61.31
intermediate and wealthy households
are members of multiple forest user
groups. To the extent that belonging to
multiple forest user groups yields more
benefits to the household, this pattern
of membership indicates an advantage
for richer households. A disadvantage
for poorer households, wealthier
households are Significantly (p <001)
better represented on community forest
user group committees than poorer
households, as Figure 1 illustrates.
Most households in rural Nepal are quite poor, own little
land or other assets, and are heavily dependent on forest
resources. Yet there are huge disparities among households
in terms of income and assets that translate into power
disparities influencing who can access what resources and
Asset Category % From CF % From PF % From NF
Very Poor 58.63 52.18 13.84
Poor 61.86 48.20 13.83
Intermediate 55.94 60.15 6.13
Wealthy 48.91 51.82 3.65
Total 59.23 51.26 12.64
9.10
18.04
23.37
18.98
afford alternatives, such as private land to grow trees.
Exploring fuelwood in more detail illustrates this point.
Table 4 shows the percentage of households expressing a
need for fuelwood that are fulfilling at least part of that need
from various sources. The distributions are fairly even for
community and private forestry, but not for other sources.
Note that poorer households are slightly more likely to access
government-managed forests (which is generally illegal)
and to use agricultural residues in lieu of fuelwood than
are wealthier households. The use of agricultural residues
for fuel may translate into lost soil fertility, as such residue
would otherwise be returned to the soil in some form. Not
surprisingly, the poorest households are the least likely to
purchase fuelwood.
Power Disparities
Those households belonging to various community self-
help groups have more social assets to call upon in crafting
their livelihood strategies. Householder interests are better
represented when they are involved in making important
community decisions about resource use, development, and
finances. For example, having a household member serve on
the executive committee of a community forest user group is a
distinct advantage. Decision-makers tend to favor their own
interests and those of others in their status group. Having a
role in important decision-making is empowering, a good in
and 0 f itself.
Only 24% of households surveyed have at least one person
who is a member of a user group or organization, such as
livestock groups, savings groups, agricultural groups,
irrigation groups, etc. There is a significant interaction (p <
.00l) between membership in such groups and asset category.
Fewer poorer households than intermediate and wealthy
households are members of these groups. Nineteen percent
of very poor households, 25% of poor households, 37% of
intermediate households, and 33% of wealthy households
belong to at least one group other than their community
forest user's group. Participation in such groups is dominated
by male members.
Most households (61%) are members of only one community
forest user group, but 29% are members of two forest user
groups, and 10% are members of three or more forest user
groups. A Significantly higher proportion (p = .005) of
•
FIGURE 1:
MEMBERSHIP IN FUG EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE BY ASSET CATEGORY
under what conditions. Central to improving livelihoods is
challenging such disparities in wealth and power, which can
become institutionalized through social norms and policy.
COlTIlllllity Forest ry Success and Fail me
In theory, community forestry can open up new livelihood
opportunities for members, but the distribution of benefits, as
mediated by institutions, is critical. In practice, community
forest organizations and institutional arrangements are having
both positive and negative impacts. In almost all the LFP
qualitative baseline study sites, informants report that forest
conditions are improving, and 82% of household survey
respondents stated that the quality of their community forest
is improving (LFP et al. 2003). However, almost none of the
LFP baseline case study user groups were actively managing
and improving their forests. As a result, community forests
are likely producing under their potential and are not
contributing to improving rural livelihoods to the extent that
they could.
In many cases user groups are generating revenue that is
used for community development and/or for micro-credit.
Such micro-credit is a sword that cuts both ways for poor
households. Loans can be important in times of crisis and
as seed money to start an income-generating activity, but
user groups tend to charge interest at a rate of 24% annually,
which can quickly bury a poor household in debt.
Although some user groups are generating revenue, at least
two-thirds are not. Almost all of the user groups in the study
have good stocks of marketable non-timber forest products
such as medicinal or aromatic herbs, resin, and cloth-grade
fibers. However, very few CFUGs in the study area are
exploiting the commercial potential of these resources, which
means most are missing opportunities to generate income that
could be used for community development and livelihoods
improvement.
Finally, there is a mixed impact on empowerment of
traditionally disadvantaged groups such as women, landless
households, and members of occupational castes. In some
cases these groups are participating in CFUG discussions
but they rarely have a role in decision-making. In at least
two-thirds of the cases in the LFP qualitative baseline
study, CFUGs have low participation by women and lower
caste groups or poor households, and there is poor or very
poor levels of awareness about user group rules, committee
formation, decision-making, CFUG funds, or the rules, rights,
and responsibilities of CFUGs generally.
As noted, many CFUGs strictly protect and 'close' their forests
during the first five years of operation (Springate-Baginski et
al. 2001; Edmonds 2002). Such an approach is encouraged by
government foresters, who often appear to be heavily involved
in crafting user groups' constitutions and operational plans
(see Springate-Baginski et al. 2003). The forest bureaucracy in
Nepal views forests as a resource to be policed and protected.
Such traditions, dating to the beginning of Nepal's forest
agencies (Pokharel 1997), encourage conservative ideals for
forest use on the part of foresters, whose values shape a user
group's forest management plan. As a result of early closure,
forest conditions improve visibly.
Although there are problems with boundary disputes in
many community forests (see Springate-Baginski et al. 2003;
see Yadav et al. 2003), the suite of rights and responsibilities
given during hand-over enables most user groups to exclude
other potential rival users effectively. Such exclusion coupled
with internal rule enforcement and sanctions translates
into effective forest protection and improvement in forest
conditions.
Although strict protection is effective in regenerating forests,
it often comes at the cost of the poorest households losing
their primary source of vital forest resources (see also Dev
et al. 2003; see also MalIa et al. 2003; Adhikari et al. 2004).
Poor households in rural Nepal depend on "free" access to
forests more so than other households because they cannot
afford the substitutes to these forest resources available on
the market. For example, when a CFUG restricts grazing,
poorer households may find that they can no longer
keep livestock because they can't afford to purchase
the fodder needed for stall-feeding. Along with its
livestock, the household loses a source of food and
income, possibly deepening its level of poverty.
Some user groups do make special provisions for the
poorest households, but such arrangements are not
universal.
The irony is that many community forests have
sufficient resources to meet at least the poorest
households' subsistence needs, and many even contain
sufficient resources to be exploited commercially.
However, anecdotal evidence combined with hard
data suggests that the vast majority of CFUGs in
Nepal practice only 'passive' management, rather
than active, production-oriented management (for
examples see Larsen et al. 2000; Edmonds 2002;
MalIa et al. 2003; for examples see Yadav et al. 2003;
Pandit and Thapa 2004). That is, CFUGs focus on
conserving and protecting forest resources rather than
developing forest-based industries or manipulating
forest conditions to improve the availability of
espeCially useful or valuable products. Thus, meeting
subsistence needs through community forestry is less
a supply problem than a management problem.
There are several causes of this management
situation. Heavy involvement of government foresters
biased toward traditional timber production and
protection forestry lead CFUGs to believe that they
can make only limited use of their forests. There
is limited technical forest management knowledge
and capacity even among government foresters, let
alone villagers. The same is true regarding forest-
based industry development and marketing. Another
cause of the management problem is that those
most dependent on community forest resources and
therefore most interested in their active utilization are
the very same groups who tend to be excluded from
decision-making.
My analysis corroborates the findings in other
research on community forestry in Nepal. For
example, as Yadav et al. report (2003), community
forestry is improving the quality of forests to varying
degrees, which in turn can and does lead to increased
benefit flows. However, improved forest resources
may not benefit all members of a user group (Dougill
et al. 2001). The results presented above also
confirm that CFUG committees and user group
decision-making are dominated by elites (Dougill et
al. 2001; MalIa et al. 2003; Timsina 2003), and that
"[g]enuinely inclusive decision-making exists only in
a minority of ... FUGs" (Dev et al. 2003, p. 75). The
data also confirm MalIa et al.'s (2003) assertion that
awareness levels about a range of community forestry
institutional issues is low, particularly among the
poorest households.
It would seem that community forestry in Nepal is not an
unmitigated success. From the government's perspective,
community forestry is successful because it is achieving
the Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation's primary goal
of protecting and even improving forests at low cost. To
international donors it is a successful program because it
is conserving forests and, on paper at least, it is increasing
people's participation. Finally, to local elites community
forestry is a great success because it is helping them
maintain their position and, in many cases, making them
money. However, in the eyes of the poorest and traditionally
disadvantaged groups, community forestry is not a complete
success, and may even cause problems.
Decision-making within CFUGs is clearly dominated by
local elites, especially men. Local elites are usually educated
and have time available for activities other than farming.
The structure of community forestry reinforces the inherent
marginalization of poorer households in three ways. First,
elites tend to make decisions that benefit themselves, and
they often place restrictions on forest use that actually harm
the poorest. Those who are being excluded from CFUG
decision-making, whether intentionally or not, are also
those who are most dependent on forests for multiple needs
including fuelwood, fodder, livestock grazing, leaf litter for
compost, and construction wood. In such a situation, poorer,
marginalized households may become more desperate and
deeper in debt, which can lead to even less time and resources
to devote to the CFUG and thus give elites even more power
over them.
Second, government foresters reinforce these power relations
because they tend to consult local elites first and most often
when conducting the fieldwork phase of CFUG formation
and later when providing services to a user group. The role
played by government foresters in maintaining unequal
power relations locally is a function of the hierarchical
structure and traditional forest protection orientation of the
forest bureaucracy in Nepal. Furthermore, the financial and
technical support provided to the government by foreign
donors may be reinforcing rather than reorienting traditions
of the forest bureaucracy.
The evidence indicates that tree density and, to some extent,
species richness are improving in most community forests.
Given the effectiveness of CFUGs in protecting forests, it
may be that elite domination and exclusion of marginalized
groups is good for the environment, but it is important to
remember that most community forests are improving
because of limitations on resource extraction rather than
active management. In other words, there may be potential
for even greater forest quality in terms of tree density, species
composition, soil fertility, and under story plant diversity
through more active management. Such improvements could
also translate into yet greater forest product availability.
Decisions to practice more active management are more likely
to emerge from decision-making bodies that represent those
who have a greater interest in improving resource availability
through active management, that is, poor households,
occupational castes, and women.
In terms of contributions of community forestry to
improving rural livelihoods, these too are limited by
conditions of unequal power. With forest handover, new
institutions are created that can serve as new social fora for
local development planning, social support services, and
social cohesion. However, in many cases the CFUG as social
forum is not accessible, or not as accessible, to marginalized
groups. Inequities in decision-making participation, power,
and associated elite domination are thus constraining the
potential for community forestry to improve livelihoods.
That community forests tend to be elite dominated has its
roots in structural biases upheld and even in part created
by the forest bureaucracy. Because the DoF is oriented
towards traditional forestry, where it sees forest protection
it sees success. The fact that forests are not being utilized
to their full potential to improve livelihoods of the poorest
and the fact that community forestry is dominated by local
elites is incidental to the forest bureaucracy, because it is
institutionally blind (or at least myopic) to goals other than
forest protection.
Government foresters are heavily involved in shaping
how community forests are utilized and governed during
the process of community forest formation and handover.
Government foresters rarely emphasize or otherwise
authentically encourage consideration of livelihood issues
within the community forestry context. Their protectionist
biases thus directly inform the perceptions of CFUG members
regarding how community forests may be used.
Because local elites tend to be better educated and are more
flexible with their time, government foresters find it easier to
work with local elites (Pokharel1997). Foresters tend to seek
out the opinions of local elites first, and local elites are more
likely than disadvantaged groups to seek out foresters for
advice or assistance. Thus, the process government foresters
use to form CFUGs and to support them after formation sees
foresters interacting mostly with local elites, and thereby
reinforcing the position of local elites as gate-keepers in their
communities.
Nepal's Ministry and Department of For~sts receives much
of its budget from international aid through bilateral donor
projects. For example, the UK's Livelihoods and Forestry
Programme provides direct financial support to government
forest offices in its operating districts, trains government
foresters, and supports them in numerous small ways such
as providing DFO staff places to hold meetings, stationary,
use of photo copiers, computers, and so on. The support that
donor projects provide district forest offices enables the DoF
to exert control over forests, promote its traditional forestry
agenda, and interact with CFUGs in a manner that maintains
domination by local elites, which in turn limits the livelihoods
improving potential of community forestry. Overall, there are
at least three obstacles standing in the way of achieving the
livelihoods potential of community forestry in NepaL These
three obstacles are elite domination locally, structural biases
within the Department of Forests, and culpability on the part
of bilateral donors.
A RECOMME DATION FOR DEMOCRATIZl G CFUG DECl510 -
MAKING
New legal instruments and institutional arrangements
must ensure fair participation in community forest decision-
making and benefit distribution for marginalized groups.
That is, community forest user groups should be organized
50 that all interests within a user group are represented on
the Forest User Group Committee (FUGC). Interest group
representatives must be encouraged, perhaps even trained,
to actively participate in decision-making. This means that
traditionally marginalized interest groups within community
forest user groups such as women, dalit, the poorest, ethnic
groups, etc., should be guaranteed positions on executive
committees. Attention to issues of fairness and participation
by diverse groups within communities would also help
unpack communities as black-boxes.
Simply requiring low caste representation on executive
committees would likely result in token membership with
no or little say in decision-making. Rather, in the process of
handing over community forestland, the government should
require that CFUG executive committees be representative
bodies for which every hamlet within a user group would
choose its own representative by whatever means they prefer.
Homogenous hamlets of low caste or particularly poor groups
would send a person to represent them who would have the
legitimacy of being popularly chosen and who would hopefully
feel a strong, motivating sense of responsibility to represent
her/his hamlet. Any low caste representative might still be
intimidated while serving on a FUGC. However, with the
proposed system, many user group committees would have
low-caste majorities, which might strengthen the confidence
of low caste committee members. To empower women, it
might be necessary to require that a certain number of women
be representatives, require hamlets to simultaneously choose
both male and female representatives, or alternate tenures so
that for a certain period a hamlet has a female representative
and in the next period has a male representative. Improving
the representative-ness of FUGCs may be empowering for
marginalized groups, a good in itself, and hopefully would
lead to community forest use decisions that benefit more than
just the elite
New laws or rules are not actually required to make FUGCs
more representative of the interests of all groups within a
CFUG, although such legal instruments may be necessary to
ensure greater, but not necessarily equal, participation. Even
without new legal requirements, CFUGs could be encouraged
to adopt provisions for representative participation on FUGCs
through the constitutional amendment process when their
current constitutions expire. Of course, the problem with
this approach is that it might meet resistance from those
currently holding power in CFUGs who likely would be
the ones amending the constitutions. This is why external
involvement is necessary.
The current practice in LFP districts of organizing hamlet
level groups could serve as an initial model. Because hamlets
tend to be fairly homogeneous they may be natural units for
sending representatives to FUGCs. The current LFP practice
should be made systematic by organizing all hamlets within a
CFUG, and making the newly formed hamlet groups the unit
of representation on FUGCs. Hamlet organizing should then
be scaled up and eventually adopted in all districts.
'Simply using quartiles to define wealth status is not meaning-
ful given the large variation in wealth and the skewed nature of the
asset value data. Rural Nepali households are quite asset-poor, so
using quartiles would suggest that one-quarter of households are
'wealthy' (see LFP et al. 2003)
2In US dollars, total asset values are as follows: Very Poor <
$13.33; Poor = between $13.34 and $90.53; Intermediate = between
$90.54 and $195.68; and Wealthy> $195.68.
3Traditionally disadvantaged groups include groups that have
traditionally low social status, often facediscrimination, may be mi-
norities within their communities, and therefore tend to be poorer.
These groups include ethnic 'caste' groups such as, Magar, Rai, Ta-
mang, and sometimes Gurung, and low or occupation castes (e.g.
sarki - shoemakers, damai - clothing makers, kami - blacksmiths)
that are dalit (untouchable).
<Deficitin this case is the difference between the amount of the
product needed and the amount of the product that is supplied from
community forests, and does not refer to total deficit
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